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REENTERING THE GOLDEN DOOR: WAIVING GOODBYE TO EXCLUSION GROUNDS FOR PERMANENT
RESIDENT ALIENS
William McKay Bennett
Abstract: Under the exclusion provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
an alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence can be prohibited from
reentering the United States after a trip out of the country. Because exclusion grounds differ
from deportation grounds, permanent resident aliens who are not deportable could leave the
country and find themselves excluded at the border upon return. The INA provides relief in
such cases by allowing permanent resident aliens who have lived in the United States for over
seven years to apply for a discretionary waiver of exclusion grounds under INA § 212(c). In
Francis v. INS, the Fifth Circuit expanded the scope of this waiver and held that the equal
protection clause requires that INA § 212(c) be available in deportation proceedings as a
waiver of deportation grounds. This expansion conflicts with both the plain language of the
statute and Congressional intent. Nonetheless, § 212(c) has become an essential form of relief
for permanent resident aliens with significant ties to the United States. This Comment
examines the confusion caused by the extension of § 212(c) and proposes amendments to the
INA redefining entry under § 101(a)(13), eliminating § 212(c), and creating a new waiver of
deportation under § 241.

Manuel Leal-Rodriguez ("Leal"), born in Mexico in 1949, came to the
United States in 1970. The following year he married his high school
sweetheart, Irma Montenegro, a U.S. citizen. The couple's first daughter
was born in 1974, after which Leal became a permanent resident alien of
the United States. In 1980, however, Leal was convicted of possession
of a controlled substance and was sentenced to five years probation.'
While on probation, Leal obtained written permission from his
probation officer and a federal district judge to visit his sick grandfather
in Mexico. Leal entered Mexico on December 21, 1982, and tried to
return on January 6, 1983.
However, at the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) inspection point at Eagle Pass, Texas, an
INS officer searched Leal's baggage and found the note from his
probation officer. The immigration officers, alerted to the prior
conviction, took Leal's green card2 and denied him reentry. They

1. The facts in this scenario are taken from Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 941-42 (7th Cir.
1993).
2. An Alien Registration Receipt Card, Form 1-551, known as a "green card," is issued after an
alien is admitted for lawful permanent residence and is valid for 10 years. See 54 Fed. Reg. 47,586
(1989). If the alien leaves the country for no longer than 12 months, the green card can be used as a
reentry permit required by INA § 223. 8 C.F.R. § 211.1(b) (1993). However, even with a green
card, a permanent resident alien is still subject to exclusion.
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informed Leal that a hearing would be scheduled and asked him to
provide a Mexican address where information could be sent. Leal's
hearing was eventually set for April 19, 1983, more than four months
after he tried to return.
Leal did not wait for his hearing. His oldest daughter was in the
hospital, and he wanted to return to Chicago immediately. Because Leal
no longer had his green card, he crossed the border by wading across the
Rio Grande. After walking for 20 hours, he was picked up by a motorist
and taken to Chicago. Leal believed that as he had obtained permission
to travel to Mexico from a federal judge, he would be able to work things
out with the INS once he returned home. However, Leal was wrong. He
relied on his probation officer and a federal judge, rwo people with no
authority over INS border inspectors. Subsequently, an immigration
judge found Leal deportable, and due to his crossing of the Rio Grande,
Leal lost his only chance of staying in the United States. Under § 212(c),
Leal could have sought a waiver of exclusion for his prior drug
conviction. However, when Leal waded across the border, he made an
illegal entry, a deportable offense that cannot be waived under § 212(c).
Leal's case is not unique. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA),3 aliens who are permanently admitted for residence4 in the United
States may be deported for any number of acts they commit after they
arrive. For example, a permanent resident alien convicted5 of one crime
of moral turpitude 6 within five years after the date of entry is deportable.7
Additionally, permanent resident aliens who travel out of the country
may be denied reentry upon return under the exclusion provisions of the

3. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1524 (West 1970 & Supp.
1994).
4. Generally, there are two types of aliens admitted for residence in the United States: immigrants
and nonimmigrants. Immigrants come to the United States as permanent residents, while
nonimmigrants enter for a limited duration determined by the purpose of their stay. This Comment
examines immigrants, commonly referred to as permanent resident aliens.
5. An alien is convicted of a crime for immigration purposes if all of the following elements are
present: 1) the alien has been found guilty, has pled guilty, or sufficient facts exist to warrant a
finding of guilty; 2) some form of punishment or restraint on liberty (including probation, a fine or
restitution, revocation of a driver's license, or community service) has been ordered; and 3) a
judgment of guilt may be entered if the alien fails to comply with some aspect of the court's order.
Matter of Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546 (BIA 1988). In states authorizing probation prior to a final
judgment of guilt, a person may still be considered convicted for immigra:ion purposes. Id. at 553.
6. Generally, crimes involving violence, fraud, narcotics offenses, most sexual offenses, and even
certain misdemeanors, such as larceny, are considered to involve moral turpitude. See Thomas
Alexander Aleinikoff & David A. Martin, Immigration ProcessesandPolicy 503-24 (2d ed. 199 1).
7. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(2) (West 1970 & Supp. 1994).
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INA.' One such provision provides for the exclusion of aliens who have
committed a crime involving moral turpitude at any time prior to
reentry.' Therefore, a permanent resident alien who commits a single
crime of moral turpitude after being in the United States for more than
five years is not deportable, but if this same alien travels abroad she is
excludable upon return. ° To further confuse matters, permanent resident
aliens who were excludable at the time of entry or adjustment of status
are deportable because they were excludable." Consequently, permanent
resident aliens allowed back into the United States may still be deported
at a later date if it is discovered that they were excludable upon return.
This Comment proposes changes to the INA to eliminate some of the
problems caused by the excludability of permanent resident aliens. Part I
discusses the definition of "entry" under the INA. Part II explores the
history of § 212(c), discusses how agency and judicial fiat have
expanded the waiver, and gives a brief overview of discretion under §
212(c). Part III identifies the difficulties caused by applying § 212(c) in
a manner divorced from the explicit language of the statute. Such
problems include judicial and administrative decisions that vary
significantly among the circuits, resulting in reduced predictability. Part
IV offers a practical solution by proposing changes to the INA that will
8. INA § 212,8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (West 1970 & Supp. 1994).
9. INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2) (West 1970 & Supp. 1994). "Entry," used in this
Comment interchangeably with "reentry," includes an alien's initial entry into the United States and
any subsequent entries. INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(13) (West 1970). See infra notes
12-19 and accompanying text.
10. The distinction between a deportation hearing and an exclusion hearing is significant.
Generally, an alien in an exclusion hearing is not entitled to due process rights. This is emphasized
by Justice Minton's statement that "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). Although Knauff has not been overruled, in Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21 (1982), the Supreme Court recognized due process rights for a returning permanent resident
alien who briefly left the United States. Id. at 32-33. By contrast, all deportation procedures must
conform to the dictates of due process. The Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher), 189
U.S. 86, 101 (1903). Additionally, aliens in deportation are allowed to choose the country they will
be deported to, assuming that country will accept them. INA § 243(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1253(a) (West
1970 & Supp. 1994). Excluded aliens are sent back to the country where they boarded the vessel in
which they arrived in the United States. INA § 237(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(1) (,Vest 1970 &
Supp. 1994).
11. Non-immigrant aliens already in the United States can apply to have their immigrant status
changed to that of a permanent resident alien without having to leave the country if they qualify.
INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1994). However, for deportation purposes,
they are treated as if they are entering the United States at the time of the adjustment of status. INA
§ 241(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(l)(A) (West 1970 & Supp. 1994). This provision, which has
no statute of limitations, enables the government to remove aliens who had no legal right to enter the
country in the first place.
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eliminate many of § 212(c)'s problems without reducing the level of
relief currently available.
THE REENTRY DOCTRINE

I.

To understand the confusion surrounding § 212(c), it is helpful to
begin with a discussion of "entry" under the INA. In United States ex
rel. Volpe v. Smith, 2 the Supreme Court held that ently includes any time
an alien comes into the United States from a foreign country, not only the
first entry. 3 The Volpe holding, known as the "reentry doctrine,"
subjects permanent resident aliens to the possibility of exclusion every
time they leave the country. 4 In 1952, this definition was codified in §
101(a)(13).15
6
The Court softened the reentry doctrine in Rosenberg v. Fleuti,1
holding that entry occurs for permanent resident al:.ens only when the
departure is intended to be "meaningfully interruptive of the alien's
permanent residence."' Therefore, permanent resident aliens who make
"innocent, casual, and brief excursion[s]" abroad might not be subject to
the consequences of reentry if the departure was not intended to disrupt
their permanent residence status.' 8 If a permanent resident alien's
departure meets this standard, commonly referred to as the "Fleuti
doctrine," the alien will not be excluded, or later deported due to
excludability. If a permanent resident alien does not fit within the Fleuti
12. 289 U.S. 422 (1933).
13. Id. at 425.
14. See Aleinikoff& Martin, supranote 6 at 452 (arguing that this interpretation of entry conflicts
with Congress's decision, as reflected in § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917, that aliens who have
resided in the United States over five years should be allowed one wrongful act without triggering
deportation).
15. Section 101(a)(13) defines entry as "any coming of an alien into the United States, from a
foreign port or place or from an outlying possession." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(13) (West 1970).
16. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
17. Id. at 462. However, the courts have not clearly defined "meaningfully interruptive." Factors
to be considered are length and reason of the absence, frequency o.' prior absences, if travel
documents were necessary or obtained, the alien's itinerary, and the alien's understanding of his
immigration status. See Aleinikoff & Martin, supra note 6 at 462-64. "[R]etums to this country
have been deemed entries for [immigration] purposes when the absence abroad was for a protracted
period, or when the alien was absent to engage in an illegal activity, or to face criminal charges, or
visited proscribed countries without permission, or left while deportation proceedings were pending
against him, or while a final order of deportation was out-standing against him thus executing it, or
attempted to smuggle aliens on his return, or when he returned without inspection, or when he
reentered the United States as a commuter." Id. at 463 (quoting C. Gordon & S. Mailman,
Immigration Law andProcedure § 4.6c (1989 ed.)).
18. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 462.
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doctrine, a dichotomy may arise. A permanent resident alien who
commits a single crime more than five years after entry is not deportable,
but if the same alien leaves the country and reenters without being
excluded, then the alien is deportable for being excludable upon entry. 9
For permanent resident aliens who do not fall within the Fleuti doctrine,
however, the Attorney General has discretion to waive exclusion grounds
upon reentry under § 212(c).20 If the Attorney General rules in favor of
the aliens, they are admitted. If not, the aliens are subject to exclusion
simply because they left the country.
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF INA § 212(C)

Over the years, both the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the
federal courts have expanded the scope of § 212(c). Written as an
exclusion waiver to allow reentry for returning permanent resident aliens
who had traveled abroad, § 212(c) now provides relief from deportation
for permanent resident aliens who have never left the country after
committing a deportable act. Not only is § 212(c) muddled by an
application that is virtually divorced from its plain language, the statute
is also complicated by administrative and judicial discretion.
A.

The BIA and the Courts Expand § 212(c)

The first expansion of § 212(c) occurred when its predecessor, the
Seventh Proviso,2' was applied in a deportation case. In Matter of L,'

19. INA § 241(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(1)(A) (West 1970 & Supp. 1994). When a
permanent resident alien is returning to the United States, a border inspector will make a
determination of the alien's admissibility. If a permanent resident alien is found to be excludable, a
further determination must be made to decide if the alien may be permitted to enter under the Fleuti
doctrine. If the alien is not allowed to enter, an exclusion hearing may be requested. While waiting
for this hearing, which may take several months, the alien may be forced to remain outside the
United States. See, e.g., Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1993).
20. Section 212(c) provides:
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily
and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile
of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without
regard to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section (other than paragraphs (3) and
(9)(C)) .... The first sentence of this subsection shall not apply to an alien who has been
convicted of one or more aggravated felonies and has served for such felony or felonies a term
of imprisonment of at least 5 years.
8 U.S.C.A § 1182(c) (West 1970 & Supp. 1994).
21. Section 212(c) began as the Seventh Proviso of§ 3 of the 1917 Immigration Act, 39 Stat. 874,
which authorized a waiver of exclusion grounds for aliens returning from a short absence to an
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the Attorney General' held that permanent resident aliens who qualify
for a waiver of exclusion grounds may apply for the waiver when they
are in deportation proceedings as a result of being excludable upon
reentry. L had been admitted to the United States in 1909 and was
convicted of stealing a watch in 1924.24 In 1939, he left the country to
visit an ill relative and was readmitted upon return.25 Later he was
arrested and placed in deportation for having committed a crime of moral
turpitude prior to entry.26 If L had been found excludable upon entry, he
would have been able to file for the waiver. The Attorney General held
that the failure to catch the alien's excludability upon entry should not
preclude the alien from seeking a waiver.2
Although Matter of L's
application of § 212(c) conflicts with the wording of the statute, the
Attorney General felt that Congress did not intend "the immigration laws
to operate in so capricious and whimsical a fashion."28 If the Attorney
General had limited § 212(c) to exclusion hearings, the INS could avoid
granting § 212(c) waivers simply by admitting excludable returning
permanent resident aliens and deporting them later when it is
"discovered" they were excludable upon reentry.
In 1956, a further expansion of § 212(c) permitted permanent resident
aliens who were deportable prior to leaving the United States to apply for
a § 212(c) waiver when they were placed in depo:.tation proceedings
after being allowed to reenter.2 9 This expansion differs from Matter of L,
because L was not deportable prior to his reentry. In Matter of G.A., a
permanent resident alien, admitted in 1913, was convicted in 1947 under
unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years. The Seventh Proviso became INA § 212(c) in
1952.
22. 1I. & N. Dec. I (BIA & A.G. 1940).
23. Under the INA, an immigration judge is responsible for the fast level of administrative
decision making in a deportation or exclusion hearing. If the judge denies a permanent resident
alien's application for a § 212(c) waiver, the alien can appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA). An appeal from a BIA decision denying a § 212(c) waiver in a deportation hearing is taken to
the appropriate court of appeals under INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C.A. §1105a(a) (West 1970 & Supp.
1994); whereas an appeal from a 212(c) denial in an exclusion hearing is taken to the district court
under INA § 106(b), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1105a(b) (West 1970). When, as in Matter of L, the INS loses a
case at the BIA, the Chairman or a majority of the Board can refer the case to the Attorney General
for review. The decision of the Attorney General is sent back to the Board and becomes precedent
for the INS. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1993).
24. Matter of L, 1 I.&N.Dec. at 1.
25. Id. at 2.
26. Id. at 1.
27. Id. at 5-6.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Matter ofG.A., 7 . & N. Dec. 274 (BIA 1956).
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the Internal Revenue Code for importing marijuana without paying
taxes.3" He left and reentered the United States in 1952, but was later
found deportable both for his 1947 conviction3' and because he was
excludable upon reentry.32 Under Matter of L, G.A. could apply for a §
212(c) waiver only for the deportation ground based upon his
excludability. The BIA, noting that relief could be granted for one
ground of deportation, found it "clearly repugnant" that G.A. would
remain deportable based on the same conviction.3 3 Thus, the BIA held
that granting a § 212(c) waiver for an exclusion ground based upon a
criminal conviction precludes a deportation proceeding based upon the
same conviction.3 4
The BIA was persuaded by the particular facts of the case; G.A.'s wife
was a legal resident, he had 10 citizen children, and he had lived in the
United States for 43 years. 3' However, the BIA failed to notice an
important distinction between Matter of G.A. and Matter ofL. G.A. was
deportable for his drug conviction regardless of whether he left the
country and reentered; whereas L's deportability was a product of his
reentry. Perhaps attempting to avoid capricious results under a statute
whose drafters were unable to foresee all contingencies, the BIA
reasoned that G.A. and L were in substantially the same situation. 36 The
BIA stressed that L, like G.A., still would have been deportable for his
conviction even if he had been granted an exclusion waiver.37 However,
the distinguishing fact that L's deportability was triggered by his reentry
was not mentioned. Allowing a § 212(c) waiver for an alien who was
deportable regardless of reentry opened the door to further expansion.
In 1976, a final expansion allowed § 212(c) relief in any deportation
proceeding in which the ground for deportation could have triggered
exclusion had the alien left the country and reentered.38 In Francis v.
INS, a permanent resident alien who, unlike L and G.A., had not left the
country prior to his deportation hearing, filed for a § 212(c) waiver in

30. Id. at 274.
31. A single controlled substance conviction any time after entry is a deportable offense. INA §
241(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(2)(B) (West 1970 & Supp. 1994).
32. Matter of G.A., 7 1. & N. Dec. at 275.
33. Id. at 275-76.
34. Id.at 275.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 276.
37. Id.
38. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
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deportation.39 The immigration judge found him ineligible for a § 212(c)
waiver of exclusion grounds since he was not in an exclusion hearing nor
was his deportation hearing based on exclusion grounds. On appeal,
Francis claimed that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment" required that all aliens be eligible for this relief. If Francis
had left the country after his drug offense and had been found excludable
upon return, he could have applied for a § 212(c) waiver which, if
granted, would have precluded subsequent deportation for the same
conviction. 41 Thus, Francis argued that the statute creates two classes of
aliens identical in every respect, except that one has departed and
returned to the United States at some point after becoming deportable.42
The Second Circuit held that the distinction between the two classes was
created by irrelevant and fortuitous factors; therefore the statute was
unconstitutional as applied.43 The court commented that both reason and
fairness suggest that aliens whose ties to the U.S. are so strong that they
have never left after their initial entries should receive at least as much
consideration as those aliens who leave and return.44
The Board of Immigration Appeals adopted the Francis holding
nationwide by refusing to distinguish between permanent resident aliens
who temporarily travel abroad and those who do not leave the U.S.45 In
1979, the BIA made § 212(c) relief available for all deportation grounds
that have matching exclusion grounds.4 6 In 1990, the BIA tried to
39. Id. at 270.
40. The court noted that "[i]t has long been held that the constitutional promise of equal
protection of the laws applies to aliens... Id. at 272 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886)).
41. See supranote 34 and accompanying text.
42. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d at 272.
43. Id. at 272-73. The court used a rational-basis test requiring that distinctions between different
classes of people be reasonable, not arbitrary, and rest upon differences that are substantially related
to the goal of the legislation. Therefore, similarly situated people must be treated alike. Id. (citing
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975)).
44. Id. at 273.
45. Matter of Silva, 16 !. & N. Dec. 26,30 (BIA 1976).
46. Matter of Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. 726 (BIA 1979) (making § 212(c) available for all
deportation grounds except entry without inspection, see Matter of Hernandez, Interim Decision
3147, 1990 WL 385764 (BA); illegal possession of firearms, see Cabasug v. INS, 837 F.2d 880 (9th
Cir. 1988); and those grounds specifically exempted by § 212(c) itself). A permanent resident alien
who "at any time after entry is convicted under any law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale,
exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying in violation of any law, any weapon . . . is
deportable." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(2)(C) (West 1970 & Supp. 1994). Because § 212(c) is not
available in such cases, a long-term permanent resident alien may be deported for possessing an
unregistered gun. In one case, a permanent resident alien fired a friend's gun into the air at a New
Year's Eve party. When police arrived, the permanent resident alien claimed the gun was his
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expand § 212(c) even further and make the waiver available for virtually
all deportation grounds.
In Matter of Hernandez,4 7 a permanent resident alien, admitted to the
U.S. in 1967, was found deportable for crossing the border without
inspection and was denied a § 212(c) waiver.
On appeal, the BIA
decided to extend the availability of § 212(c) to all grounds of
deportation except those with comparable exclusion grounds specifically
exempted in § 212(c). 49 The BIA expressed concern that under Francis,
§ 212(c) offered relief to aliens who had committed far more serious
crimes than illegal entry." Emphasizing that the statute as applied bears
little resemblance to the statute as written, the BIA concluded that the
equal protection arguments made in Francis supported such an
expansion.5 However, Hernandez was short lived. INS Commissioner
McNary referred the decision to the Attorney General for review,52
requesting that § 212(c) be used only as a waiver of exclusion grounds
for permanent resident aliens seeking reentry.53 The Attorney General
reversed the BIA's decision and held that § 212(c) relief be available in
deportation hearings only when the asserted ground of deportation is also
a ground of exclusion. 4
Recently, the Second Circuit again expanded § 212(c). In an opinion
admittedly in direct conflict with the Attorney General in Hernandez, the
court held that § 212(c) may apply in a deportation proceeding for entry
without inspection. 5 The Second Circuit acknowledged a traditional
because the owner, a U.S. citizen, was on probation and the gun was unregistered. Based on advice
of his attorney, he pled guilty to a charge of reckless endangerment and was sentenced to community
service. He was subsequently deported based on this conviction. Telephone Interview with Jay
Stansell, Attorney for the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, Seattle, Washington (July 26, 1994).
47. Interim Decision 3147, 1990 WL 385764 (BIA).
48. Id. at *2.
49. Id. at *4. When Hernandez was decided, § 212(c) exempted exclusion grounds relating to
subversives and war criminals. Id. Today, § 212(c) denies relief to permanent resident aliens
convicted of one or more aggravated felonies for which they have served a term of imprisonment of
at least five years, aliens excludable as international child abductors under § 212(a)(9)(C) and aliens
excludable for security and related grounds under § 212(a)(3). 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(c), (a)(9)(C),
(a)(3) (,Vest 1970 & Supp. 1994). Aggravated felonies include murder, drug trafficking, and crimes
of violence. 8 U.S.C.A. § I 101(a)(43) (West 1970 & Supp. 1994).
50. Matter of Hemandez, Interim Decision 3147, 1990 WL 385764 at *6.
51. Id. at *4-*5.
52. See supranote 23.
53. 67 Interp. Rel. 354 (1990) (this would have required overruling Matter of Silva and Matter of
L).
54. Matter ofHemandez, Interim Decision 3147, 1990 WL 385764 at *20.
55. Bedoya-Valencia v. INS, 6 F.3d 891 (2d Cir. 1993).
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argument that because aliens who have already entered the United States
can't be excluded, Congress did not intend § 212(c) to cover entry
without inspection. 6 However, the court believed that this rationale
supported a finding that Congress did not consider the issue, making any
attempt to find legislative intent fruitless." Absent any indication that
Congress intended otherwise, the court felt that allowing § 212(c)
waivers for entry without inspection promoted both coherence and
consistency. 8
B.

Exercise of Discretion Under§ 212(c)

In addition to understanding the complex extension of § 212(c)'s
scope, a brief overview of administrative and judicial discretion under §
212(c) clarifies how the statute actually functions. Section 212(c) is
entirely discretionary and, although permanent resident aliens must
demonstrate that their applications are entitled to favorable rulings,59 the
statute provides no guidance as to when the alien meets this burden.
Consequently, the BIA has attempted to develop a coherent standard for
exercising discretion while the courts have struggled to do the same upon
review.
In order to determine if a 212(c) application warrants favorable
discretion, the BIA has established a balancing test that weighs positive
and negative factors.6 0 Positive factors include family within the United
States, length of residence, age when residence began (residence
beginning at a young age weighs more favorably), evidence of hardship
to the alien or her family if deportation takes place, service in the U.S.
military, a consistent employment history, a showing of rehabilitation if a
criminal record exists, prior service and value to the community, and
other evidence attesting to good character." Negative factors include the
nature and circumstances of the deportation or exclusion ground,
additional violations of U.S. immigration laws, the :aature, seriousness,
and recency of any criminal record, and any other evidence of bad
character or undesirability as a permanent resident of the United States. 2
56. Id. at 897.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Matter of Main, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 582-83 (BIA 1978). Matin is the seminal case on
exercise of discretion under § 212(c).
60. Id. at 583.
61. Id. at 584-85.
62. Id. at 585.
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When a permanent resident alien has committed a particularly grave
offense, such as drug trafficking, the alien must make a greater showing
of favorable circumstances by demonstrating unusual or outstanding
equities. 3 Additionally, some cases may involve adverse factors of such
a serious nature that they cannot be offset.61
When an alien appeals a BIA decision65 denying a § 212(c) waiver,"
the reviewing court uses an abuse of discretion standard of review.67
Generally, the BIA abuses its discretion if a decision is unsupported by
rational explanations, departs from established policies, or discriminates
invidiously against a particular race or group. Inclusion of an improper
factor is grounds for remand,69 and a denial of relief can be affirmed only
on the basis actually stated in the BIA decision.7 ° Improper factors may
include the permanent resident alien's failure to marry the mother of his
children and the "illegitimacy" of those children.7" Factors that are not
mentioned will be assumed not to have been considered. 2 Consequently,
the Board must consider all factors73 when weighing equities,74 so that a
reviewing court can determine that the BIA's decision resulted from
thoughtful deliberation and was not merely a reaction.75
When a permanent resident alien has been convicted of a crime, the
BIA should evaluate the nature and underlying circumstances
surrounding the conviction in order to evaluate its weight as a negative
factor.7 6 The BIA or the immigration judge may not create a blanket rule
63. Id. at 585, 586 n.4.
64. See Matter of Buscemi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 628 (BIA 1988) (denying § 212(c) waiver for an alien
convicted of attempted sale of heroin and attempted robbery who had shown considerable favorable
equities).
65. See supranote 23 outlining the review process.
66. The BIA apparently lacks a clear standard for reviewing an immigration judge's § 212(c)
decision, reviewing either de novo or for abuse of discretion. See Charlesworth v. INS, 966 F.2d
1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1992). For a scathing commentary by Judge Posner regarding this
inconsistency, see Ortiz-Salas v. INS, 992 F.2d 105, 107 (7th Cir. 1993).
67. Vargas v. INS, 831 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1987).
68. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 993 F.2d 169, 170 (8th Cir. 1993); Yepes-Prado v. INS,
10 F.3d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1993).
69. Braun v. INS, 992 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1993).
70. Mattis v. INS, 774 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1985).
71. Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1370.
72. Id.
73. See supranotes 60-64 and accompanying text.
74. Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1366.
75. See Becerra-Jimenez v. INS, 829 F.2d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
76. Martinez-Benitez v. INS, 956 F.2d 1053, 1055 (1 lth Cir. 1992).
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that categorically denies relief to aliens convicted of certain crimes." An
unwritten policy of denying § 212(c) relief for certain categories of
crimes is a contravention of Congressional policy and is inconsistent
with the duty to evaluate applications on a case-by-case basis.78 The
exercise of discretion under § 212(c) is a complex undertaking
exacerbated by the statute's lack of guidance.
III. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEMS
The expansion of § 212(c) far beyond the text, coupled with a vague
standard for exercising discretion, makes interpreting the statute difficult.
Even the most detailed reading of § 212(c) would shed little light on how
the statute is actually applied. It is rather ironic that a statute applying to
immigrants, whose English proficiency varies greatly, is understandable
by only those thoroughly proficient in English and well-versed in
immigration law. Even an attorney, when asked by permanent resident
aliens if they place themselves at risk by leaving the country, would need
to conduct an in-depth analysis before offering a qualified answer.
Although increasing relief, the Fleuti doctrine and Francisand its legacy
have complicated § 212(c) in a way Congress never could have foreseen.
A.

Section 212(c) "sComplexity Creates Confusion andReduces
Predictability

Complex case law together with variations in interpretation and
application reduce the predictability of § 212(c). Permanent resident
aliens traveling out of the country need to know whether they could be
excluded upon return, and if so, whether their absences would fall within
Fleuti. If Fleuti is applicable, they need to know if they could seek §
212(c) waivers and the likelihood that such waivers would be granted.
Even under such a step-by-step analysis, it would be difficult to
determine a predictable outcome. For aliens applying for a § 212(c)
waiver of deportation, the uncertainty is just as great because the
discretionary balancing of positive and negative factors offers little
predictability.
77. See Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1371 (holding that it was impermissible for the BIA to deny
relief merely because the alien was convicted of a drug crime).
78. Id. at 1371-72. See also De Gonzalez v. INS, 996 F.2d 804, 810-11 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding
that the failure of the INS to produce more than one case in which the EIA exercised discretion in
favor of a petitioner convicted of a serious drug offense strongly suggested an unauthorized policy of
denying § 212(c) relief in drug cases).
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Manuel Leal's case illustrates some of these problems. Although a
federal judge gave Leal permission to travel to Mexico, Leal was not told
he risked exclusion upon return due to his criminal conviction. 9 In fact,
Leal's case is fraught with irony. Without the letter from his probation
officer approving his travel plans, it is unlikely that he would have been
excluded because the border inspectors were probably unaware of his
prior conviction. If he had been allowed to enter, he still could have
been deported at a later date for being excludable upon entry. However,
if he could show his trip fell within the Fleuti doctrine, he could not be
excluded or deported as a result of his reentry. Nevertheless, when Leal
crossed the border illegally to be with his daughter in the hospital, his
trip was no longer "innocent" and therefore was outside the scope of
Fleuti.0 This illegal crossing, prompted by a father's desire to be with a
sick child, hurt Leal in two ways. He became ineligible for the Fleuti
doctrine, and he lost the ability to apply for a § 212(c) waiver, since the
Seventh Circuit does not allow a § 212(c) waiver for entry without
inspection." By contrast, if Leal had been in the Second Circuit, this
relief would have been available.8 2 Accordingly, the only predictable
advice one can provide an alien is never leave the United States. This
may seem unreasonable, but given the high stakes, it may be the most
prudent advice."
B.

The Expansion of§ 212(c) Has Clouded the Role of the Judiciary

Although § 212(c)'s unpredictability is due, at least in part, to the
judiciary, the courts have struggled to decipher the statute as well. The
beginning point of statutory interpretation generally involves the
obvious: read the statute.84 A plain reading of § 212(c) suggests that the
statute allows a waiver of exclusion grounds for permanent resident
79. Judge Cummings, dissenting in Leal, noted that most people would take it on good faith that
when a federal judge gives permission to travel out of the country, it is proper to do so. LealRodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 956 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cummings, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 944.
81. Id. at 946.
82. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
83. Telephone Interview with Jay Stansell, Attorney for the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project,
Seattle, Washington (July 26, 1994). Mr. Stansell recommends that permanent resident aliens who
are excludable but not deportable become naturalized citizens, if possible, before traveling out of the
country. Id.
84. See H. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in H. Friendly,
Benchmarks 202 (1967) (offering Justice Friendly's "threefold imperative to law students: (1) read
the statute; (2) read the statute; (3) read the statute").
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aliens returning to the United States after traveling abroad. However,
when the plain meaning gives an absurd result, as in Matter of L,"5 where
a permanent resident alien with a prior criminal conviction had traveled
abroad and was not excluded upon return but wa in deportation for
being excludable upon entry, judicial interpretation is necessary.
Authorities are split on the proper role of the judiciary, however,
Judge Richard Posner, a leading law and economics scholar, advocates
the "imaginative reconstruction" method.86 This requires a judge to
determine what the enacting legislature would have wanted and act
accordingly.8 7 In Matter of L, one could argue that if Congress had
thought about L's situation, it would have written § 212(c) to encompass
such circumstances. By comparison, Judge Easterbrook, also a law and
economics scholar, supports a textualist "clear statement" approach that
would have the judiciary follow only the specific instructions of the
legislature. 88 Easterbrook believes that silence or gaps in a statute are
possible indicia of legislative intent.8 9 This approach could lead a judge
to conclude that Matter of L was wrongly decided. For example,
Congress could have intended that the government have the option of
allowing excludable aliens who might qualify for § 212(c) waivers to
reenter. After reentry, these excludable aliens could be placed in
deportation proceedings in which § 212(c) waivers would not be
available. Although this interpretation is questionable, Easterbrook
argues that any finding of legislative intent is dubious due to the limited
abilities of the judiciary.
These two views have found their way into the case law regarding §
212(c). The Ninth Circuit, for example, took a position similar to Judge
Easterbrook's. The court remarked that it had little reason to doubt that
Congress intended § 212(c) apply only to exclusion, noting that Congress
wrote a separate statute for discretionary relief from deportation.9
85. 1I. &N. Dec. 1 (BIA & A.G. 1940).
86. See Richard A. Posner, The FederalCourts: CrisisAnd Reform 286-87 (1985).
87. Id. at 287.
88. See Frank Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533. 544-52 (1983).
89. Id.
90. See id. at 551 (arguing that few judges "have the skills necessary to learn the temper of times
before our births, to assume the identity of people we have never met, and to know how 535
disparate characters... would have answered questions that never occuned to them").
91. Cabasug v. INS, 837 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1988) (referring to Suspension of Deportation
under INA § 244(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. 1254(a)(2) (West 1970 & Supp. 1994)). Suspension of
deportation allows the Attorney General to waive deportation for any eligible alien and adjust the
alien's status to that ofan alien lawfiully admitted for permanent residence. For a permanent resident
alien who is found to be deportable, this would have the effect of reinstating his lawful permanent
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Likewise, the First Circuit seemed to approve a "clear statement"
approach. When refusing to expand § 212(c), the court commented that,
although § 212(c) is a poorly framed statute, judicial "tinkering" is much
to blame for the "mess."92 The court concluded that Francis and its
aftermath created an "untidy patchwork" 93 and reasoned that, absent
judicial intervention, Congress would have recognized and repaired any
problems long ago.94 Although unable to imagine a Congressperson who
would be pleased with the present state of § 212(c), the court still
deferred to Congress for any improvement.95 Although Congressional
action is possibly the most appropriate method of solving problems
created by § 212(c), the First Circuit may be giving Congress too much
credit. It has been more than 50 years since Matter of L, and although
numerous courts have lamented § 212(c)'s confusion, Congress has
offered no remedy.
The Second Circuit, unwilling to wait for Congressional action, has
expanded § 212(c) to include entry without inspection.96 The court
supported its decision by citing Congressional inaction since Francis,the
significant departure from the text of the statute, and the need for
coherence and consistency the statute's application.97 However, due to
the conflicting perspectives on the role of the judiciary in interpreting
statutes, the consistency the Second Circuit seeks is unattainable. The
BIA adopted the Francis rule nationally," and seven circuits have
explicitly accepted the Francisholding.99 The Second Circuit is now the
only circuit to allow a § 212(c) waiver for entry without inspection. This
varied application of § 212(c) can be corrected only by Congress. The
confusion surrounding the interpretation and application of § 212(c) and
resident alien status. However, suspension is construed more narrowly than § 212(c). See infra
notes 129-38 and accompanying text The court in Cabasugwent on to note that Congress would
not have enacted § 244(a) if it intended for § 212(c) to apply to both exclusion and deportation.
Cabasug v. INS, 837 F.2d at 883.
92. Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 315 (Ist Cir. 1992).
93. Id.
94. Id. at316.
95. Id.
96. Bedoya-Valencia v. INS, 6 F.3d 891 (2d. Cir. 1993).
97. Id. at 897.
98. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
99. See De Gonzalez v. INS, 996 F.2d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 1993); Variamparambil v. INS, 831 F.2d
1362, 1364 n.l (7th Cir. 1987); Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 640 F.2d 223, 224 (9th Cir. 1981);
Chiravacharadhikul v. INS, 645 F.2d 248, 248 n.1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981);
Mantell v. INS, 798 F.2d 124, 125 (5th Cir. 1986); Lozada v. INS, 857 F.2d 10, 11 n.1 (1st Cir.
1988); Vissian v. INS, 548 F.2d 325,328 n.3 (10th Cir. 1977).
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the Second Circuit's unitary holding send this message loud and clear: it
is time to amend the INA.
IV. PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE INA
The most logical way to correct the problems with § 212(c) is to
amend the statute. The following proposal suggests redefining entry so
as to exempt permanent resident aliens from the consequences of an
entry when they choose to travel abroad. However, this would make §
212(c) unnecessary because the INS could no longer exclude permanent
resident aliens and thus § 212(c) could be repealed. Although these two
changes eliminate all of the problems mentioned above, they deprive
permanent resident aliens of the valuable relief from deportation that §
212(c) now offers. Therefore, the final part of this proposal suggests the
creation of a new exemption from deportation for long-term permanent
resident aliens who fall within the current scope of § 212(c).
Eliminatingthe Reentry Doctrinefor Permaneni Resident Aliens

A.

Changing the definition of entry under INA § 101(a)(13) so that
permanent resident aliens are no longer subject to :he reentry doctrine
would effectively eliminate the controversy surrounding § 212(c) and the
Fleuti doctrine. This can be accomplished by amending the definition to
read as follows:
The term "entry" means any coming of an alien, other than an alien
who is a lawful permanent resident of the United States, into the
United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying
possession, whether voluntarily or otherwise. 1"0
As long as permanent resident aliens remain in lawful status, they are
free to travel.'' On the other hand, if they are deportable, then the
government must pursue deportation, not exclusion, to remove such
aliens from the country. This serves four purposes: 1) it resolves the
0 2 2) it eliminates the
equal protection problems raised in Francis,'
confusion caused by the administrative and judicial expansion of §
100. This is very similar to a definition proposed in a 1986 bill that passed the House but was not
considered by the Senate. H.R. 4823, § 101(a), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
101. However, permanent resident aliens who travel abroad for more than a year risk losing their
permanent resident status. 8 C.F.R. § 211.1A (1993).
102. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1976). See supranotes 38-44 and accompanying
text.
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212(c) and the varying interpretations of Fleuti among the circuits, 3) it
allows for much more efficient processing of returning permanent
resident aliens at the border, and 4) it ensures permanent resident aliens
due process in deportation hearings."0 3
Under this revised definition of entry, permanent resident aliens could
reenter the country without being subject to exclusion grounds, thus
eliminating the dichotomy in Francis. Permanent resident aliens could
not be placed in deportation because they were excludable upon reentry;
they could be found deportable only for acts unrelated to their reentry. 4
The two classes of aliens that created an equal protection violation under
Francis would no longer exist. Although Francis would still be
deportable for his crimes, there would no longer be a similarly situated
group of aliens who could file for a waiver simply because they traveled
abroad and returned prior to being placed in deportation.
Eliminating the reentry doctrine for permanent resident aliens also
eliminates the confusion surrounding the Fleuti doctrine. Determining
when an alien intends his departure to be "meaningfully interruptive
of... permanent residence ' O5 is no easy task. The Select Commission
on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP) recognized the difficulty of
interpreting the Fleuti doctrine when it made a similar proposal to
redefine entry in 1981.06 SCIRP noted that, although the Fleuti doctrine
exempts permanent resident aliens who take innocent, casual, and brief
trips out of the country from exclusion upon return, 107 the Supreme Court
had not defined this exemption.' Testimony regarding the hardship on
permanent resident aliens created by the case-by-case interpretation of
the reentry doctrine0 9 further convinced SCIRP of the need for an
amendment."t0

103. See supranote 10.
104. Except for aliens guilty of entry without inspection who would still be deportable. INA §
241(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(l)(B) (vest 1970 & Supp. 1994).
105. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449,462 (1963).
106. Select Committee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, US. Immigration Policy and the
National Interest, Final Report 284-86 (1981) [hereinafter SCIRP] (recommending that returning
permanent resident aliens still be subjected to exclusion for crimes committed while abroad, certain
political grounds, entry into the United States without inspection, and engaging in persecution.).
107. See supranotes 17-18 and accompanying text.
108. SCIRP, supranote 106, at 285.
109. See, e.g., Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939,941 (7th Cir. 1993).
110. SCIRP, supranote 106, at 285-86.
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Additionally, this new definition of entry would substantially reduce
litigation and provide for more efficient use of INS resources."' The
number of deportation and exclusion hearings wculd decrease, and
border inspections could focus on persons entering the United States for
the first time or for reasons other than residency, such as business and
tourism. The INS expressed reservations about such an amendment to
"entry" in 1986, when a bill which included a version of the SCIRP
recommendation was introduced in the House." 2 The fact that some
permanent resident aliens who would be excludable under the current
system (i.e., for committing one crime of moral turpitude prior to
reentry) would not be deportable under the proposal troubled the INS.
Additionally, the INS claimed that if it were required to deport, rather
than exclude, returning permanent resident aliens, its costs would
increase because in deportation the burden is on the government to
establish deportability; whereas in exclusion the burden is on the alien to
prove admissibility." 3 However, as the SCIRP report suggested, by
removing an entire class of aliens from exclusion proceedings, the INS's
caseload may actually diminish," 4 especially given that not all permanent
resident aliens who could be excluded are also deportable.
Consequently, the INS's position fails to consider overall efficiency and
the fact that, but for the mere incident of leaving the country and
reentering, the permanent resident alien would not be excludable.'
The final purpose served by redefining entry is that it guarantees
permanent resident aliens the due process of a deportation hearing. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that aliens have little or no due
process rights in exclusion hearings." 6 However, once in the United
111. Id. at 286.
112. H.R. 4823, supra note 100. The bill would have defined "entry" as "any coming of an alien,
other than an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United States, into the United States,
from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntary or otherwise." Id. §
101(a).
113. Administrationof the Immigration andNationality Laws: Hearings on H.R. 4823, H.R. 4444,
and H.R. 2184 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and InternationalLaw of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1986) (statement of Richard E. Norton, Associate
Commissioner, Examinations, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service).
114. SCIRP, supra note 106, at 285-286.
115. The INS's concerns seem particularly unfounded given that the bill also proposed an
amendment to INA § 242 to allow the immediate detaining of returning permanent resident aliens
pending a determination of deportability. H.R. 4823, § 101, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(b) (1986).
The apparent reason for this addition was to alleviate concerns that deportable permanent resident
aliens, who could no longer be excluded, would escape detection once they were back inside the
United States.
116. See supra note 10.
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States, Constitutional protection provides due process rights in
deportation hearings." 7 This results from the distinction between an
alien at the border and an alien in the United States who is both subject
to and protected by its laws. Therefore, the government is free to
determine what procedure it deems fair for aliens who are entering for
the first time or for illegal entrants at the border."' Ironically, an illegal
alien in the United States is entitled to more due process than a
permanent resident alien in an exclusion hearing." 9
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility of
increased due process rights for returning permanent resident aliens
placed in exclusion proceedings, 2 ' permanent resident aliens still face
much uncertainty if they choose to travel outside the country. Because
courts recognize due process rights for aliens who have lawfully, or even
unlawfully, entered the United States, it is both inconsistent and
inequitable that aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence may
lose these rights simply because they have left and then returned. While
considering the 1986 bill, the Committee on the Judiciary agreed that it
was unfair to place returning permanent resident aliens in exclusion
rather than in deportation.'
The American Immigration Lawyers
Association (AILA) also supported the bill." AILA argued that the
contributions of permanent resident aliens, combined with the increased
likelihood of family ties and personal investments in the United States,
warranted providing them greater due process rights than an illegal,
temporary, or first-time visitor."as The INS's concern for administrative
efficiency,' even if well founded, hardly seems a valid reason for lower
117. Id.
118. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties": A Response to
Martin,44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 237,258 (1983).
119. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) ("[A]liens who have
once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to
traditional standards of fairness encompassed indue process of law... But an alien on the threshold
of entry stands on a different footing).
120. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (holding that a returning permanent resident
alien placed in exclusion is entitled to due process rights, but not necessarily equivalent due process
to a deportation hearing).
121. H.R. Rep. No. 99-907, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 25 (1986) (citing the greater due process
protections offered in deportation proceedings).
122. Administrationof the Immigration andNationalityLaws: Hearingson H.R. 4823, H.R. 4444,
and H.R. 2184 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and InternationalLaw of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 210 (1986) (statement of Warren R. Leiden, Executive
Director, American Immigration Lawyers Association).
123. Id.
124. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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due process protections. Redefining entry as proposed entitles those
aliens with the greatest ties to the United States to the due process of
deportation hearings, thus guaranteeing them the same level of due
process as aliens who have entered the United States illegally.
B.

Repeal and Replacement of§ 212(c)

If permanent resident aliens are not excludable, then § 212(c) becomes
unnecessary. The elimination of § 212(c) reduces the confusion caused
by the expansion of the statute and enhances efficiency by reducing the
INS's caseload. 125 However, eliminating § 212(c) also removes a
valuable source of relief from deportation for permanent resident aliens'26
because the catch-all relief from deportation under INA § 244,127
suspension of deportation, 28 does not provide as much protection to
permanent resident aliens. Consequently, this proposal suggests an
amendment to § 241 adding a waiver of deportation that provides relief
comparable to § 212(c).
Suspension of deportation under § 244 applies to all aliens, not just
permanent resident aliens, and thus is strictly construed. Suspension
allows any deportable alien to apply for a discretionary waiver of
deportation and adjustment of status to that of a lawfully admitted
permanent resident alien. 129 To qualify for suspension, an alien being
deported for a criminal conviction must be "physically present in the
United States for a continuous period of not less than ten years
immediately following the commission of an act, or the assumption of a
status, constituting a ground for deportation .. .. "30 This language
imposes a considerably more stringent residency requirement than that of
§ 212(c),' which requires only that a permanent resident alien
125. See supranote 111 and accompanying text.
126. Neither the SCIRP report nor the House bill proposed eliminating § 212(c), even though the
proposed amendment to § 101(a)(13) would make § 212(c) unnecessary. Although it is possible that
this was a mere oversight, it seems more likely that § 212(c) was lef; intact so that permanent
resident aliens could still apply for the waiver in deportation.
127. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1994).
128. See Cabasug v. INS, 837 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1988). See supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
129. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(a)(2) (West 1970 & Supp. 1994).
130. Id.
131. The strict language of § 244 is softened somewhat by adopting Fleuti and excluding
absences that are brief, innocent, and casual and that do not meaningfully interrupt the alien's
presence. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(b)(2) (West 1970 & Supp. 1994). Initially, § 244 did not contain a
Fleuti limitation and "continuous physical presence" was given a literal interpretation that denied
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demonstrate a "lawful unrelinquished domicile" in the United States for
at least seven years. While § 244 generally requires that the deportable
act occurred more than ten years ago,1 32 § 212(c) requires only that the
alien's residence be lawful for seven years.'3 3
The difficulty of qualifying for § 244 is further compounded by two
' 13 4
other provisions that require an alien to prove "good moral character
and to demonstrate that deportation would result in "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship" to the alien or a spouse, parent, or child
who is a U.S. citizen.1 35 What constitutes extreme hardship remains
unclear. For example, economic hardship can be considered but, by
itself, is insufficient.' 36 These additional requirements may be justified
because, as noted above, any alien who meets the residency requirements
may apply for suspension. No preference is given to aliens who are
permanent resident aliens. An alien who has managed to live illegally in
the United States for the necessary period is as eligible as a permanent
resident alien who has been in the country for the same amount of time.
Since § 244 is clearly an inadequate substitute for § 212(c) for long-term
permanent resident aliens, Congress should adopt a separate category of
relief for permanent resident aliens under § 241.
An additional waiver under a newly drafted § 241(d) could read as
follows:
(d) Waiver of grounds of deportation for certain immigrants

suspension to an alien who had taken a three-month trip overseas. INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183
(1984). This led Congress to add § 244(b)(2) in 1986, overturning Phinpathya.
132. The ten-year requirement is for aliens deportable for criminal convictions. 8 U.S.C.A. §
1254(a)(2) (,Vest 1970 & Supp. 1994). Under this proposal long-term permanent resident aliens
could not be excluded, therefore the only relief lost by repealing § 212(c) is the ability to apply for a
waiver of deportation for criminal grounds.
133. Although it is not settled as to when a deportable act causes lawful domicile to end for §
212(c) purposes, one court has held that the date of the deportable act itself does not end lawful
domicile. Marti-Xiques v. INS, 741 F.2d 350 (1 th Cir. 1984).
134. Good moral character is not defined in the NA, although, § 101(f) defines what is not good
moral character-for example, habitual drunkenness. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(f) (West 1970 & Supp.
1994).
135. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(a)(2) (West 1970 & Supp. 1994). The Court has applied a strict statutory
interpretation to this section, allowing aliens to qualify only if they can demonstrate the necessary
hardship to themselves or to specified family members. See INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85, 107 (1986)
(per curiam) (overturning a Third Circuit decision ordering the BIA to consider an alien's
relationship to her nieces for demonstrating extreme hardship, and holding that Congress specifically
determined the class of relatives to be considered).
136. Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon, 682 F.2d 143, 146 (7th Cir. 1982).
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The provisions of subsection (a) of this section (other than
paragraph 4) shall not apply to an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence who has maintained a lawftl unrelinquished
domicile of 7 consecutive years unless, in the opinion of the
Attorney General, the alien is found to lack good moral character as
described in section 101(f) during the first 7 years of lawful
unrelinquished domicile required to qualify for this subsection.
The first sentence of this subsection shall not apply to an alien who
has been convicted of one or more aggravated felonies and has
served for such felony or felonies a term of imprisonment of at least
5 years.
This waiver would function like § 212(c), with some significant
improvements. The biggest difference is that the proposed § 241(d)
greatly reduces the scope of discretion. It allows waiver of deportation
unless the alien is found to lack good moral character.137 This
determination is still subjective, of course, but the INA offers some
guidelines as to what is not considered good moral character.'38 By
limiting discretion to one issue, the proposed § 241(d) increases
efficiency. The balancing test of positive and negative factors under §
212(c) is no longer necessary.'39 The burden would shift to the
government to show lack of good moral character, forcing the
government to be more selective in choosing whom to deport. However,
it would not preclude the deportation of those permanent resident aliens
that the government feels are a particular detriment to society. 40 Fewer
deportation hearings coupled with fewer exclusion hearings, as a result
of exempting returning permanent resident aliens from exclusion, should
allow the INS to redirect resources to more pressing matters, such as
border control.
137. Focusing on good moral character reduces the overall scope of discretion, but may not be the
best way to increase fairness and efficiency. A similar waiver, focusing on the balancing test set
forth in Marin, may be a better solution. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. Although
this would allow for more discretion, it would also allow factors such as family in the United States,
evidence of rehabilitation, and other positive considerations, to offset any negative factors.
Additionally, both the INS and immigration attorneys are accustomed to this test.
138. INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(f) (West 1970 & Supp. 1994).
139. See supranotes 59-64 and accompanying text.
140. The SCIRP report considered abolishing deportation entirely fcr long-term (seven to ten
years) permanent resident aliens, except in the case of heinous crimes. Of the eight members who
voted, five were in favor of such a proposal (five members chose to pass on this vote). The members
in favor of the proposal felt that permanent resident aliens and their families suffer undue hardship as
a result of deportation when other penalties would be more appropriate. They also noted that the
suspension of deportation process is not an adequate remedy. SCIRP, supranote 106, at 279-81.
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Additionally, unlike § 244, the proposed § 241(d) requires aliens to be
of good moral character only during the first seven years of lawful
unrelinquished domicile. Under § 244, aliens resident in the United
States for longer than seven years are required to show good moral
character for all years of continuous presence prior to their application
for suspension. Like § 212(c), the proposed § 241(d) would not require a
showing of hardship or extreme hardship. Neither would it include the
extremely restrictive residency requirement that § 244 imposes on aliens
who are deportable for crimes. Placing this waiver in the deportation
chapter of the INA would also make the statute easier to read.14 ' Such a
waiver would officially recognize the special relationship that long-term
permanent resident aliens have with the United States and would increase
predictability, while not infringing on the INS's ability to monitor the
borders.
V.

CONCLUSION

Permanent resident aliens occupy a unique status in our society. In
1893, Justice Brewer suggested that a separate class, "denizen," be
created for permanent resident aliens who dwell in this "middle state,
between an alien and a natural born [citizen]."142 Although the
immigration laws have evolved, this uncertain "middle state" still exists,
allowing the INS to deny reentry to permanent resident aliens who are
not deportable. The expansion of § 212(c) provides permanent resident
aliens with some added protection, but Congress has not explicitly
approved of this practice. Such uncertainties make the INA difficult for
even federal judges to interpret. Yet for immigrants, the people most
affected by the INA, understanding these provisions is vital. A few
simple amendments to the INA would begin to solve these problems,
while also increasing the INS's efficiency and its ability to control the
borders.

141. All relief from deportation would be under Chapter V of Title II of the INA, which deals
with deportation and adjustment of status. On the other hand, § 212(c) is under Chapter II of Title H,
which deals with admission and travel control.
142. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 736 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
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